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The South Carolina 
Republican Presidential Primary: 
Issue Advocacy Groups and Campaign Spending 
William V. Moore 
College of Charleston 
Danielle Vinson 
Furman University 
The Federal Election Ca mp aign Act created restr ictions 
for presidential candidates on the size of campaign con-
tributions, candidates' personal campaign spending, and 
spendi ng levels by candidates and other groups . In 
Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Supreme Court declared 
limitations on campaign spending unconstitutional, un-
less candidates accept federal matching funds . One result 
has been the growing importance of expenditures and 
campaig n activities by issue advocacy groups . This paper 
describes the important co nsequ ences of campaign fi-
nance reform and issue advocacy groups in the important 
South Carolina Republican Presidential Primar y. 
INTRODUCTION 
Historically , presidential candidates depended on large contrib utors to finance their campaigns; however, the costs of running a successful presidential campaign 
have escalated because of the expanded use of commu-
nications. Congres s, in response to these spiraling costs and "fat-
cat" influenc e over campaigns, enacted the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971. This act placed limits on the 
We wish to thank the Pew Chari table Trust for its support in the production of this 
paper . 
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amount candidates could contribute to their own political cam-
paigns, limited media activities, and required strict disclosure of 
the campaign finance activities of candidates and political com-
mittees (Gierzynski 2000 , 42). 
The campaign abuses that occurred during the 1972 presi-
dential election by Richard Nixon ' s Committee to Re-elect the 
President resulted in amendments to the FECA in 1974 designed 
to limit the influence of money in elections. The Act limited the 
size of contributions, limited the amount candidates could con-
tribute to their own campaign, established a level of expendi-
tures by candidates and other groups , and set up a system of 
public funding for presidential candidates (Gierzynski 2000, 42). 
During the presidential primaries, candidates could receive 
matching funds if they adhered to expenditure limits. In 1976, 
however , the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo declared 
unconstitutional many of the provisions involved with spending 
limits. In particular , the Court said such limitations constituted a 
violation of the freedom of speech clause of the First Amend-
ment (Buckley v. Valeo 1976). The provisions declared invalid 
included those limiting expenditures by candidates, by groups 
operating independent of candidates , and by candidates spending 
their own money . The Court did uphold, however , limits on 
contributions to presidential campaigns and limits on expendi-
tures by those candidates who accepted public funds . 
In 1979, Congress passed additional amendments to the FECA. 
One amendment raised the minimum contributions and expendi-
tures that had to be reported from $100 to $200. Another amend-
ment permitted party committees to raise and spend an unlimited 
amount of money on party building activities, such as registration 
and getting out the vote (Wayne 2000, 34-35). This 
soft money provision created a loophole that allowed the national 
parties to raise and distribute enormous amounts of money to state 
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and local parties. For example, in 1996, the National Democratic 
Party reported soft money expenditures of $121.8 million while 
the National Republican Party had soft money expenditures of 
$149 .7 million (Wayne 2000, 46). 
Issue advocacy groups have also become more involved in po-
litical campaigns. These groups are not limited in how much they 
can spend independently for or against a candidate and there are 
almost no regulations or requirements requiring them to report 
how they paid for their advertising . As a result , issue advocacy 
groups are becoming a much more significant part of the election 
process as more money is channeled through interest groups in-
stead of candidates. As long as these groups ' ads do not expressly 
advocate a candidate's election or defeat, they are not subject to 
donation limits . In fact, the Annenberg Policy Center of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania estimated that one-third of the total dollars 
spent on advertising in federal elections in 1996 was attributable 
to issue advocacy efforts (Faucheux 1998, 18). 
In 2000 , both federal funding for presidential campaigns and 
issue advocacy groups played a role in Governor George W. 
Bush's primary election victory in South Carolina . Bush chose to 
finance his own primary election campaign and raised $60 million 
in 1999. That combined with money the campaign raised in 2000, 
resulted in a new record for most money raised by a presidential 
candidate , more than $102 million. 1 Senator John McCain chose 
to accept federal matching funds , a decision that limited his total 
expenditures as well as his expenditures by state. In addit ion, nu-
merous issue advocacy groups became involved in the South 
Carolina primary campaign in support of Governor Bush. The 
Bush financial resourc es coupled with the efforts of the issue ad-
'"Cam paign Spending Sc:ts New Reco rd ." New York Times on the Web. 6 Nove mber 
2000. 
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vocacy groups , resulted in a major victory for the Bush campaign 
in South Carolina . 
SOUTH CAROLINA: THE SETTING 
As in recent presidential elections, South Carolina was a cru-
cial battleground for the Republican Party ' s presidential nomina-
tion . While New Hampshire has made a habit of deflating front-
runners , South Carolina has restored them to their original posi-
tion.2 Since 1980, the state has supported every presidential front-
runner. In fact, South Carolina has been referred to as the 
"firewall ," since insurgents like Pat Buchanan and Pat Robertson 
have seen their campaigns end with the South Carolina primary. 
The South Carolina Republican presidential primary is his-
torically the first primary in the South, making it an important 
barometer for candidates , the media , and political analysts of 
southern Republican political preferences . In 2000, the state 
took on added importanc e because of insurgent John McCain's 
stunning 19 percentage-point victory over front-runner George 
Bush in New Hampshire and because Senator McCain had tar-
geted South Carolina as the second of four states essential to his 
campaign - New Hampshire , South Carolina , Michigan, and 
Arizona. Mc Cain 's campaign believed that if he won those four 
contests , he could force Bush out of the race. 3 
South Carolina has undergon e significant political change in 
recent years. Immigration from the Northeast and Midwest has 
changed the state's demo graphy, primarily in the Piedmont sec-
tion and the retirement communities along the coast. In addition , 
in the 1990s, $42 bill ion was invested in manufacturin g industries , 
lJim Varley and David Firestone. ·'Old-Line Republicans Find an Independent Streak 
Among the Voters," New York Times, 17 February 2000. 
3John Weaver, McCain Campaign Staff, telephone interview by David Magleby, 14 
June 2000. 
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creating 207 thousand new jobs. 4 This economic growth has been 
a boom for the state's Republican party. In 1987, Republicans 
held only 29 of 124 seats in the state house, while in 1994, the 
party controlled a majority of the state house seats for the first 
time since Reconstruction. In 1994, South Carolina also elected a 
Republican governor for the third consecutive time. While the 
Democratic Party regained the governor's position in 1998, the 
state's Republican base is considered the strongest of any Deep 
South state. Thus, South Carolina's presidential primary is con-
sidered an important barometer of Southern Republican sentiment. 
THE CAN DIDATE CAMPAIGNS 
John McCain's election strategy in South Carolina was de-
signed to attract the newer Republican voters in the state along 
with independent and Democratic voters, who could vote in the 
state's open primary. In contrast, George W. Bush emphasized 
conservative themes to energize the traditional economic and so-
cial conservatives in the state's Republican party. His strategy in 
South Carolina was to build a wall between McCain and the social 
conservatives. 5 Bush started his campaign with an appearance at 
Bob Jones University, a Christian fundamentalist school in 
Greenville that banned interracial dating and whose leaders had 
once labeled the Catholic Church, a "Satanic Cult." 6 In a state 
where the Christian Right is estimated to be one-third of the Re-
publican voters, the Bush strategy, coupled with the efforts of is-
sue advocacy groups, proved to be effective. 7 
'Yarley and Firestone, op cir. 
' Warren Tompkins, telephone interview by Danielle Vinson, 19 June 2000. 
0 Glen Johnson, "Bush Regrets Bob Jones Appearance," 77ze (Columbia] Sare, 28 February 
2000 , AI . 
' Bob P:i.slay and James Hammond, "Upstate a Force in Bush Win," Greenville News, 21 
February 2000. I A. 
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In addition to McCain and Bush, Steve Forbes and Alan Keyes 
were also active in South Carolina. Forbes campaigned in South 
Carolina until February 9, 2000 . Following his loss in the Dela-
ware primary on February 7, he abandoned his campaign after 
spending $35 million ; Forbes' departure was so abrupt that his 
commercials attacking Bush were still running on South Carolina 
television and radio stations after his withdrawal from the race.8 
The two front-runners ran positive campaigns in South Caro-
lina through January 2000 . McCain's victory in New Hampshire, 
however , quickly • changed the tenor of the South Carolina race. 
Both candidates aired negative ads on radio and television , and 
their campaigns accused each other of using negative push polls 
to sway voters. Both trotted out high profile members of the South 
Carolina Republican party to appear at campaign events , to record 
ads and phone messages to voters, and to sign their names to cam-
paign literature . Bush had the support of former Republican Gov-
ernor Carroll Campbell, Senator Strom Thurmond, Attorney Gen-
eral Charlie Condon, several local congressional representatives, 
and numerous state legislators, including the speaker of the South 
Carolina House of Representatives. McCain received active sup-
port from Congressional Representatives Lindsey Graham and 
Mark Sanford and some members of the state legislature , includ-
ing the speaker pro tempore . Though many perceived Bush as the 
national party establishment candidate , McCain was able to make 
inroads into the state party . These divisions contributed to some of 
the rancor of the campaign . 
In addition to the very visible airwave war, with advertising 
and appearances designed to attract the media, the maj or candi-
dates mounted an extensive ground war to increase their support 
through phone banks and mailings. At least 21 different phone 
sRichard L. B~rke, "Forbes Exiis and the Contenders Rush In," New York TimeJ, IO Febru-
ary 2000. 
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messages were sent out by the candidates' campaigns, most of 
them during the final two weeks of the primary battle. 
The Bush calls included a canvassing ad "Would you support 
Bush?," a call inviting voters to meet Bush, and at least two get-
out-the-vote calls. Bush's campaign also paid for recorded mes-
sages from Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL), SC Attorney Gen-
eral Charlie Condon and former governor Carroll Campbell. The 
campaign also paid for 45 to 50 thousand recorded get-out-the-
vote calls by Christian Coalition founder Pat Robertson. (Magleby 
2000, 13). Bush's polling firm made at least 300 push poll calls 
that included harsh "questions" about McCain without identifying 
who was paying for the poll (Fineman and Isikoff 2000, 22). One 
woman in Spartanburg, South Carolina said her son had taken a 
call from a pollster who portrayed John McCain as a "cheat and a 
liar and a fraud. "9 Bush said he would fire anyone who had con-
ducted a poll portraying McCain as a liar and fraud. Bush aides 
released a script of one of their phone messages in which the 
Senator Strom Thurmond said, "unfortunately the race has turned 
ugly. John McCain has TV ads comparing Governor Bush to Bill 
Clinton. There is no excuse for the negative ads." 10 Thurmond 
called it sad and said it was the sort of message the people of the 
country have rejected. 
McCain had at least one persuasion call and two GOTV 11 calls. 
His campaign also paid for calls that targeted Democrats. In one 
of these, Democratic State Senator Phil Leven tis called "20,000 of 
[his] closest friends" to ask them to vote for McCain. 12 People 
who received this call and others like it claimed they had only 
"Alison Mitchell wtth Frank Bruni, "Spotlight Tums on Ugly Side of Politicking," New 
York Times , I I February 2000, A22. 
'"Ibid. 
''G ~t-Out-the-Vote. 
1isou1h Carolina Stale Senator Phil Leventis, telephone interview by William Moore. 12 
June 2000. 
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voted in Democratic primaries in the past and could not have been 
on any Republican phone lists. Keyes also had one GOTV call. 
Candidates bombarded targeted voters with mail. A network of 
voters turned up 21 different mailings paid for by the Bush cam-
paign and 31 pieces paid for by McCain. In addition, McCain sent 
out at least 15 e-mail messages to active supporters and people 
who had added their names to his subscription list. The Bush 
campaign maintained an e-mail tree of more than 12 thousand 
names of people who had provided their e-mail addresses to the 
campaign. 13 The messages distributed across this network were 
mostly campaign updates, press releases, candidates' schedules, 
news articles about the campaign, and the campaign's response to 
some of the news reports . 
CANDIDATE CAMPAIGN SPENDING 
Because of the importance placed on the South Carolina pri-
mary by the candidates and the media, the amount of money spent 
on the Republican primary by the major candidates was inordi-
nately high. While George Bush was not required to file a state-
by-state report with the Federal Election Commission, Tucker Es-
kew, a representative for the Bush campaign, said Bush spent in 
the neighborhood of $4 million in South Carolina. 14 Newsweek 
and an anonymous Republican Party contact estimated that Bush 
spent closer to $8 million in the state, 15 while one member of the 
McCain campaign staff estimated that Bush spent between $10 to 
15 million . 16 South Carolina state Democratic Chairman Dick 
Harpootlian said, "George Bush spent $10 a vote or more, so it 
13Warren Tompkins, telephone interview by Danielle Vinson, 19 June 2000. 
"Joseph Stroud, "South Carolina Saves Bush," TT,e Stale, 20 February 2000, A 16. 
,s"Back From the Brink," Newsweek , February 28, 2000. 24. 
16Trey Walker, McCain Fie.Id Campaign Director, tek phone interview by William Moore, 
I 3 June 2000. 
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shows he does live by the Golden Rule: 'He who has the gold 
rules. "' 17 McCain's report to the Federal Election Commission 
listed his South Carolina's expenditures at $2,940,377 while Alan 
Keyes spent approximately $280,662 and Steve Forbes, who did 
not have to report his expenditures, spent $48,600 on advertising 
in the state's four major media markets. 
The largest expenditures went to media advertising. In the 
major media markets-Columbia, Charleston, Florence, and 
Greenville-Bush only outspent McCain by approximately $170 
thousand: Bush spent an estimated $1,681,554 to McCain's 
$1,511,930. However, the timing of the advertising worked to 
Bush's advantage. McCain started his advertising in 1999. While 
this provided him with greater name recognition, it negatively 
affected his campaign in the final week of the primary contest 
since he had reached the maximum expenditures allowed in South 
Carolina. McCain's Deputy Campaign Manager, Roy Fletcher, 
said, "we had reached our spending cap and we couldn't fight 
back." 18 McCain's field director, Trey Walker, said that even 
though money was available, McCain refused to violate the 
spending limits. 19 In contrast, the Bush campaign had bought so 
much media advertising that Bush commercials were still running 
in South Carolina the day after the primary. 
Since the Bush campaign did not significantly outspend 
McCain in the major media markets, the obvious question is how 
the additional monies were allocated. Bush strategists, Warren 
Tompkins and Heath Thompson, believed Bush spent more on 
radio advertising than McCain. The Bush campaign wrote and 
17Schuyler Kropf, "Decisive Win Boosts Momentum," TTie [Charleston] Post and Courier, 
:!O February 2000. 14A. 
'~Roy Fletcher. McCam Deputy Campaign Manager, News Forum on Issue Advocacy, 
Na11onal Press Club. Wash111g1on. D.C.; 17 July 2000. 
"Trey Walker. McCain Field Campaign Director, telephone interview by William Moore, 
13 June 2000. 
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produced these radio spots locally. They were harder edged, lo-
calized, and easy to target, especially when McCain went after 
Democratic support. In addition, the volume of telephone calls 
people received from the Bush campaign suggests that Bush also 
devoted substantial resources to phone contacts. While Warren 
Tompkins estimated that at least 1 million phone calls were made 
by the Bush campaign, Heath Thompson estimated the figure to 
be between 2.5 and 3 million. 20 Thompson said the campaign 
started with volunteer phone banks in 21 counties; however, the 
vast majority of calls during the last three weeks were paid calls. 
They included recorded messages from various political figures. 
THE INTEREST GROUP CAMPAIGNS 
The candidate campaigns were supplemented by an intense, 
personal, and negative issue advocacy campaign by interest 
groups. Nearly three-fourths (74%) of the issue advocacy money 
was spent attacking or supporting candidates; only 26% consti-
tuted pure issue advocacy. Virtually all of this activity attacked 
John McCain . The interest groups used e-mail, fax, phone, mail, 
newspaper ads, and radio and television communications. Some 
have described what happened as "carpet bombing ," and state Re-
publican Party Chairman Henry McMaster said the ground war 
was "like flying over a jungle; you couldn ' t really tell what was 
going on." 21 
The interest groups involved included the National Right to 
Life Committee (NRLC), South Carolina Citizens for Life, the 
Christian Coalition, the Keep It Flying PAC, the National Smok-
20Heath Thompson, Bush campaign staff, telephone interview by Danielle Vinson, 22 June 
2000. 
21Henry McMaster, Chair. SC Republican Party , telephone interview by William Moore. 13 
June 2000 . 
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ers Alliance, several anti-immigration groups, the English Lan-
guage PAC, and Capital Watch. 
Just as the candidates adopted a negative tone in South Caro-
lina, interest groups also shifted their themes and messages from 
New Hampshire to South Carolina. The groups active against 
McCain in New Hampshire shifted their theme and message in 
South Carolina to a highly personal attack on McCain's charac-
ter and his views on religious conservatism. Several of these 
groups had criticized McCain months earlier. In September 
1999, representatives of the NRLC had held a press conference 
in South Carolina with representatives from the Christian Coali-
tion, Americans for Tax Reform, and the National Rifle Asso-
ciation to criticize McCain's position on campaign finance re-
form. 
On February 10, the NRLC and South Carolina Citizens for 
Life threw their support behind Bush in press conferences in 
South Carolina and Washington, D .C. This unusual endorsement 
fractured relationships among some of the strongest abortion foes 
in the state. Cyndi Mosteller, the leader of the Citizens for Life 
Chapter in Charleston, called the endorsement inconsistent with 
the group's policy of withholding endorsements when more than 
one anti-abortion candidate is in the race. 22 
Holly Gatling, Executive Director of South Carolina Citizens 
for Life, stated the group's shift in strategy from New Hampshire 
to South Carolina was the result of McCain's uncertainty over how 
to answer a hypothetical question posed to him in New Hampshire 
concerning what he would do if his teenage daughter wanted an 
abortion. His statements convinced the pro-life groups that 
McCain would not be strongly pro-life. McCain 's statements also 
reinforced their concerns about his campaign finance reform pro-
nMichd le Davis, "Abomon Foes Endorse Bush in the South Carolina Primary," 77,e State 
10 February 2000, A8. 
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posals. When it became clear after the New Hampshire primary 
that the race was really between McCain and Bush, the groups 
decided to endorse Bush to avoid any confusion on the part of the 
voters about who the "real pro-life" candidate was. This coincided 
well with the Bush campaign's decision to energize the religious 
conservatives in the state. 
One activity of the NRLC in South Carolina consisted of run-
ning ads, especially on Christian radio stations, throughout South 
Carolina questioning McCain's pro-life record and commitment. 
The ads talked about McCain's votes in favor of fetal-tissue re-
search and his friendship with former Senator Warren Rudman 
who is pro-choice. FEC figures show that the group spent $44,287 
on radio ads. The FEC also reported that the NRLC gave $3 thou-
sand to South Carolina Citizens for Life, which coordinated with 
the national organization on the radio ads. The director of the 
South Carolina organization said her group only spent $5 hundred 
on the race; everything else was by the national group. 
The national and state pro-life groups worked together to send 
mailings to about 80 thousand households. The mailings encour-
aged voters to compare the candidates, citing Bush's pro-life po-
sition against Roe v. Wade and the use of "tax dollars to fund ex-
periments that use body parts from aborted babies" in contrast to 
McCain's conflicting statements and voting record on these is-
sues. The mailing noted that in New Hampshire, "pro-choice Re-
publicans overwhelmingly preferred McCain above all the other 
candidates." The NRLC did one push poll phone call. The call 
encouraged people to vote for Bush, saying McCain would not 
reverse Roe v. Wade. It also claimed that Bush had maintained a 
strong pro-life position and that he was endorsed by Henry Hyde. 
The Christian Coalition was also involved in the anti-McCain 
effort, reportedly targeting 140 thousand voters in the state. The 
Christian Coalition of South Carolina sent out a card two days 
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before the primary, entitled "10 disturbing facts about John 
McCain." These "facts" targeted McCain's stands on abortion, 
taxes, and other issues important to the Christian Right. For ex-
ample, Fact 5 stated that "John McCain voted repeatedly in favor 
of federal funding of experiments using tissue from aborted ba-
bies" and Fact 6 said "John McCain's economic plan would result 
in the taxation of certain contributions to churches and charities." 
The mailing claimed McCain said he might appoint Warren Rud-
man attorney general, quoting from Rudman's book: "The Re-
publican Party is making a terrible mistake if it appears to ally 
itself with the Christian Right." The mailing mentioned that 
McCain was the only Republican candidate "who sought and re-
ceived the endorsement of the Log Cabin Republicans, a pro-
homosexual rights group." Finally, the mailing raised concerns 
about McCain's position on abortion and campaign finance re-
form. 
The Christian Coalition of American also sent out a GOTV 
card to select voters encouraging them to vote. Members were 
also active in putting up signs, working phone banks, and going 
door-to-door. On a Sunday talk show during the South Carolina 
campaign, Pat Robertson made a veiled allusion to "some of those 
other things that are in John McCain 's background." Finally, as 
previously noted, the Bush campaign distributed a recorded phone 
message by Pat Robertson. Robertson's personal involvement il-
lustrates the intensity of the anti-McCain sentiment within the 
Christian Coalition and the religious right. 
Other groups besides the pro-life and religious-right organiza-
tions were active in the campaign. The Keep It Flying PAC en-
tered the campaign at the last minute. The group , which advocated 
keeping the Confederate Flag flying above the South Carolina 
capitol, sent out an estimated 80 to 250 thousand letters dated Feb-
ruary 11, 2000 . The letter quoted McCain as saying "111e Confect-
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erate Flag is offensive in many, many ways. As we all !mow, it ' s a 
symbol of racism and slavery ." However , the letter omitted the 
rest of McCain 's statement that said he could "understand how 
others might not feel that way" and mentioned his own relatives 
who fought for the Confederacy. 23 The letter noted that of the 
major candidates , only George Bush had refused to call the Con-
federate flag a racist symbol and it quoted Laura Bush as saying, 
"It is not a symbol of racism." In addition to supporting Bush, the 
letter attacked "liberal Democrats" in the state legislature, Gover-
nor Jim Hodges, the NAACP, Bill Clinton, and Al Gore . It in-
cluded a "Keep the Flag! Dump Hodges!" bumper sticker and 
asked contributions to pay for TV and radio ads. The McCain 
campaign staff suggests the Bush campaign and the PAC might 
have coordinated their efforts because the head of the group, 
Richard Hines, is a friend of Bush strategist Warren Tompkins. 
Tompkins denied any prior lmowledge of the PAC's activities. 24 
The National Smokers Alliance also attacked McCain, in part 
because of his sponsorship of an unsuccessful bill in 1998 that 
would have increased tobacco taxes by more than $500 billion. 25 
The Alliance spent $25 thousand on radio and television adver-
tising to remind smokers and tobacco growers in South Carolina , 
a state where tobacco is the number one cash crop, of McCain's 
record. 26 
One other group opposing John McCain was the English Lan-
guage PAC , which spent $7,075 on newspaper ads in two cities. 
The ads claimed that McCain opposed English as the official lan-
guage . They ended by saying "When John McCain asks for your 
13Dan Hoove r, "McCai n Bac ktrac ks on Flag ," Greenville News 11 January 2000, I 13. 
24WaiTen Tompkins , telephone interview by Danielle Vinson, 19 June 2000 . 
25 Hoover, op. cit. 
26Michell e Davis , "The GO P Primary: Smo ke Gets in Your Eyes," The (Co lumbia] Stnte. 6 
February 2000, 04 . 
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vote, answer him, answer him in a language he understands: 
'No!"' 
The only identified group supporting McCain was Health Phy-
sicians for McCain. However, this turned out to be a front name 
for the owner of a pawnshop in Columbia who was upset about 
the attacks on McCain. 27 He bought $2,500 worth of commercials 
on one television station in Columbia . Another individual, the 
president of Carolina Solar Lighting , ran a full-page ad for two 
days for his company that included a letter of support for McCain 
and two pictures of McCain (one current and the other a 30-year-
old military picture) in two major newspapers in the state. Al-
though he claimed to have received a special rate for the ads, 28 an 
estimate based on the cost of a full-page retail ad suggests that he 
spent close to $24 thousand. 
Anti-immigration groups constituted the major non-candidate 
specific issue advocacy groups active in South Carolina. The 
groups include Numbers USA.Com, Federation for American 
Immigration Reform (FA.IR), Negative Population Growth, 
Population Environment Balance, and American Immigration 
Control Foundation . These groups did not endor se a candidate , but 
told people to ask candidates about mass immigration. The groups 
ran newspaper ads of approximately one-half a page in eleven 
major dailies in South Carolina. Numbers USA , FAIR , and Nega-
tive Population Growth also ran radio and television ads and ad-
vertised on billboards across the state. In the major media mar-
kets, Numbers USA spent $34,500, FAIR $31,432, and Negative 
Population Growth $49,192 on electronic advert ising. 
" Trey Walker. McCain Field CJmpnign Director. telephone interview by William Moore, 
13 June 2000. 
28Dan Russell. President 01 · Carolina Solar Lighting, telephone interview by Jenny Willis, 
'March 2000. 
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One other general issue group, Capital Watch , ran radio ads in 
Charleston and Columbia asking candidates to sign a pledge not 
to spend social security. Their expenses totaled $1,150. 
Other campaign activity attacking McCain was undertaken in-
dividually . For example, Thomas Burch, chair of the National 
Vietnam and Gulf War Veterans Coalition, joined Bush for a rally 
in Sumter, South Carolina, and endorsed him. In the endorsement, 
Burch maligned McCain's record on veterans' affairs. The next 
day, five U.S. senators criticized Bush for the appearance and 
voiced support for McCain 's record. A Bob Jones University pro-
fessor sent an e-mail claiming that McCain had fathered two chil-
dren out of wedlock and had a reputation for partying , drinking, 
and womanizing. A Baptist Church in Topeka, Kansas faxed a 
flyer criticizing McCain 's "Fag Army" to South Carolina radio 
stations, all .media outlets in Phoenix , Arizona , and all media out-
lets in Washington, D.C.29 World Magazine, sent out by God's 
World Publishing Company in Asheville, North Carolina, also 
attacked McCain . On election night itself, some people went so 
far as to call radio talk shows and claim that a team of psychia-
trists had determined that the Vietnamese had brainwashed 
McCain and programmed him to destroy the Republican Party . 
EFFECTIVENESS OF OUTSIDE SPENDING 
Both campaigns agreed that the pro-life groups and the Chris-
tian Coalition were most effective, because they clearly presented 
to their supporters that McCain was not a pro-life, religious con-
servative , and was even a threat to these things. Roberta Combs , 
the Executive Vice President of the Christian Coalition said after 
19Westboro [Topeka. KS.] Baptist Church Representative. telephone interview by Anna 
Nibley, 14 June 2000. 
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the election, "I think we played a major role."30 The decision by 
NRLC and South Carolina Citizens for Life to endorse Bush pre-
vented the religious conservatives from splitting their votes be-
tween Bush and Keyes, who was an attractive alternative for some 
people. In an interesting twist, Keyes gave these groups more 
credibility when he publicly declared in his speeches and debates 
that he could not support McCain if McCain won the nomination 
because of his views on abortion, thus corroborating what the pro-
life groups were saying. 
The impact of other groups is less certain. Much as been made 
about the late entry of the Keep It Flying PAC into the race. How-
ever, Warren Tompkins, a Bush strategist, questions the impor-
tance of the PAC's involvement "in the grand scheme of things" 
for several reasons. First, the mailing by the group, while timed 
with the presidential primary, actually attacked numerous officials 
and groups in the state. In fact, McCain was not mentioned until 
the bottom of the first page, and only eleven lines of the two-page 
letter dealt with McCain or Bush. Second, though the letter did 
include only part of McCain's statement, there had been much 
news coverage of the subject in most of the major papers across 
the state, and those articles had included McCain's positions and 
his attempts to clarify the confusion on the issue. As Tompkins 
points out, people to whom this was an important issue had plenty 
of opportunities to read about McCain's positions in the newspa-
per or hear about them on television or radio, and they had proba-
bly already formed their opinions about the candidates. Also sup-
porting this theory is the existence high profile pro-flag state leg-
islators active in McCain's campaign. 
The Keep It Flying letter did generate some response, though it 
is not clear from whom. On election day, some people reported 
30
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receiving a phone call warning that Bush was in favor of keeping 
the flag on the capitol; the caller encouraged voters to support 
McCain. 
The issue advocacy groups, primarily the anti-immigration or-
ganizations, were visible during the campaign through their media 
commercials, newspaper ads, and billboards. These groups, how-
ever, had little impact on public opinion in South Carolina, a state 
that has a small immigrant population. 
The National Smokers Alliance ad campaign complemented 
the Bush campaign. In particular, the ads appeared while McCain 
and Bush were debating tax cuts. These ads reinforced Bush's 
message that he, not McCain, was the candidate for tax reform. 
CONCLUSION 
South Carolina became a critical state for George Bush fol-
lowing his defeat in the New Hampshire primary . In order to se-
cure the state he effectively moved to the right. He successfully 
courted the state 's religious conservatives starting with his ap-
pearance at Bob Jones University. He also vowed to keep the strict 
pro-life plank in the GOP platform and he refused to meet with 
the Log Cabin Republicans . He was assisted in his successful 
campaign by several groups that attacked McCain in a variety of 
ways . Dick Polman of Knight Ridder said that Bush won in South 
Carolina "with extensive help from Ralph Reed, Pat Robertson 
and other Christian activists who painted McCain as a hypocrite 
with an immoral past." 31 Newsweek noted that local surrogates in 
South Carolina accused McCain of various apostasies on abortion, 
gambling, and taxes. It also cited the role played by Pat Robert-
31 Associated Press, "Exit Poll," Voter News Service. 19 l'ebruary 2000. 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
SOUTH CAROL!NA REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY 67 
son, Jerry Falwell, the National Smokers Alliance, Keep It Flying, 
and pro-life forces. 32 
The nasty and personal tenor of the South Carolina primary 
was frequently mentioned in interviews with the campaign staffs 
of both Bush and McCain. Bush pollster Jan Van Lohuizen saw 
South Carolina as "personal, going both ways with veracity being 
the issue."33 John Weaver of the McCain campaign said he had 
"never seen a more negative environment" than the 2000 South 
Carolina Republican primary. 34 Richard Quinn , a South Carolina 
consultant to McCain described the allied attack on McCain as a 
"scorched earth strategy." 35 Trey Walker , another campaign con-
sultant described the campaign as a "jailhouse rape,"36 while Ray 
Fletcher said, "I've never seen anything like it and I come from 
Louisiana. "37 
Exit polls show the effectiveness of the campaign by George 
W. Bush and his surrogates. With the negative tone and the sheer 
volume of voter contacts and ads, the contest generated extraordi-
nary voter interest. Pre-election projections predicted that as many 
as 400 thousand voters would tum out. 38 The actual turnout was 
565,704.39 In 2000 , over 100 thousand more voters went to the 
polls than in 1996 and the 2000 voter turnout nearly doubled the 
1992 turnout of 356,289 voters. 
32
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Magleby and Jason Beal, 14 June 2000. 
HJohn Weaver, telephone interview by David Magleby, 14 June 2000 . 
35R.ichard Quinn, McCain Campaign Com,ultant, telephone interview by Da, 1d 8. Magleby 
and Jason Beal, 14 June 2000 . 
3
"Trey Walker, McCain Fit:ld Campaign Director, telephone interview by William Moore, 
13 June 2000. 
" Roy Fletcher, News Forum on Issue Ai.lvocacy, National Press Club, Washington, D.C.. 
17 July 2000. 
l8"Record Turnout Being Preuicted at Polls," Greenville News, 19 February 2000, I A. 
39Paslay and Hammond, op. cit. 
VOL . 29 2001 
68 MOORE & VINSON 
The single most important block of voters was religious con-
servatives. Of the voters in the primary 34% considered them-
selves to be part of the religious right and 67% of them voted for 
Bush-only 10% voted for McCain . On abortion, 41 % of the vot-
ers felt it should be illegal in most cases; 17% said it should al-
ways be illegal. Fifty-eight and 66% of those, respectively, voted 
for Bush. 
John McCain's effort to attract independents and Democrats 
was somewhat successful; however, the large turnout of core Re-
publican voters doomed his effort. Exit polls showed that 79% of 
Bush voters said they were Republicans while 62% of McCain 
voters were not. 40 
Ironically, the anti-McCain attacks by outside groups allowed 
Bush to present an image of himself taking the high road in the 
campaign. And, in fact, voters in South Carolina said that it was 
McCain-not Bush-who had run the nastier campaign .~' While 
the anti-McCain groups could not legally run a coordinated cam-
paign , their attacks complemented Bush's successful campaign 
strategy and helped propel him to a 13 percentage-point victory in 
South Carolina. The victory in South Carolina provided Bush with 
the momentum needed to win the Republican Party's nomination 
for president in 2000. Contributing to his victory were federal 
laws limiting John McCain ' s expenditures and allowing issue ad-
vocacy groups to campaign on George Bush's behalf . 
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